cross-posted from : https://lemmy.zip/post/71321898

Netzpoltik details that police are able to gain access in this way either through physical access to someone’s phone or by intercepting verification codes via a state-sanctioned phishing attack or intercepting SMS messages via telephone surveillance

  • Agent641@lemmy.world
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    1 month ago

    The burglar broke in by knocking on the door and waiting for someone to come to the door and open it and then asking if they could come in and were let in and asked if they could just take stuff and the person said sure go nuts.

    • deltapi@lemmy.world
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      1 month ago

      Almost. More like they asked to use the bathroom then unlatched the bathroom window, left, and returned later through that window when the homeowner wasn’t paying attention

  • PattyMcB@lemmy.world
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    1 month ago

    The article also mentions using linked device access. Clever. Fuck the police, though.

  • anon_8675309@lemmy.world
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    1 month ago

    The headline makes people think signal is somehow broken.

    It’s not. Just be careful and monitor your account. And don’t let anyone gain physical control of your device.

  • peopleproblems@lemmy.world
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    1 month ago

    Interesting they highlight Signal again as though this is a vulnerability.

    If someone else has access to a linked device… that’s you fucking up access controls.

    • not@lemmy.dbzer0.com
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      1 month ago

      I want a version of Signal that doesn’t allow linked devices. Linking devices is a clear vulnerability.

      • peopleproblems@lemmy.world
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        1 month ago

        Im going to go out on a limb here and suggest something that should be obvious - you don’t have to link devices

          • peopleproblems@lemmy.world
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            1 month ago

            Signal does not use SMS.

            The vulnerability they call out in the article is a phishing attack. A phishing attack requires the user’s input. There is no defense, no security, no techniques or technology to prevent you from handing the key to your safe to someone else.

    • skisnow@lemmy.ca
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      1 month ago

      It’s a vulnerability precisely because people always swarm to defend Signal in stories like this, as though using Signal means the authorities (or other bad actors) can’t read your messages. Seems like every six months there’s some story involving Signal users getting hacked, and every time there’s a rush of wellacshuallys explaining why it wasn’t really Signal’s fault. (that last one is particularly egregious because I remember people defending it as “it wasn’t Signal, it was their partner who they subcontracted and gave your personal data to”, which is crazy levels of mental gymnastics.)

      Security is more than just encryption. If you flag something up as “hey use this if you want to hide from the Government” and have a personal phone number attached to it, that’s like a red rag to a bull.

      (edit: LOL, it’s hilarious how many people think they’re making great rebuttals in the replies when all they’re doing is proving my point. One child even flew directly into screaming at me. Signal fanbois are even worse than Apple supporters)

  • conorab@lemmy.conorab.com
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    1 month ago

    I might be mistaken but I don’t think Signal uses SMS alone to gain access to a chat so the attack vector for the Signal part based on what the article is saying is that the police are just getting access to a device that’s already authorised (and has the keys) then just adding in another device which they control. This sounds like Signal functioning as expected. The article does refer to police not wanting to give away too many details to maybe there’s something that hasn’t been disclosed, but the cited methods (assuming SMS is off the table for Signal) sound like normal behaviour.

  • time2lose@lemmy.worldBanned
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    1 month ago

    Telegram and whatsapp never had encryption. Also - they just give your messages on law enforcement request, always have.

    Signal - how does it work with signal again?

    • FriendOfDeSoto@startrek.website
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      1 month ago

      They are a bit vague on this but I suspect all of these attack vectors start with LEOs having physical access to the unlocked phone. They then set up a trusted desktop without the phone owners knowing.

      Which is clever, to be fair. Whether or not that’s legal is already a court case. The law is so frightfully grey.

      • peopleproblems@lemmy.world
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        1 month ago

        Its also a failure of the user’s access control and operating security.

        Once a third party has access to the secure environment, that environment is and will always be compromised.

        • undrwater@lemmy.world
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          1 month ago

          Is the user made aware of this by the operator (signal, telegram, et al)?

          If not, it’s a big haul to get to competency. The operator should be educating users on how to limit compromise.

          • gandalf_der_13te@feddit.org
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            1 month ago

            i just logged into signal on my desktop app about 4 hours ago, and about 90 minutes after that i got a message from signal to my phone to inform me about this.

              • anon_8675309@lemmy.world
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                1 month ago

                Yes. How does that happen? You open the app you type a message you hit send. In that process WhatsApp has access to your clear text message that they get from the keyboard. They can do whatever they want with that. They could encrypt your message with your key and also one of their keys. They could send those together so that they look like one message but at their servers split their copy off.

  • deltapi@lemmy.world
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    1 month ago

    To me, this proves that the police can still get the information they need without us handing over our encryption keys and requiring ‘service providers’ to MITM for them.

    • cley_faye@lemmy.world
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      1 month ago

      Except they had to get the keys, at least for Signal, as described in the article. Only you can allow a new device. If you get a notification for a new device and you go “sure, let me flash that code for you”, you’re giving the key. And a moron.

      Can’t say about the other services.

  • Optional@lemmy.world
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    1 month ago

    Signal failed to prevent soneone from accessing my unlocked phone and starting Signal! Everything was right there!

    • Zarobi@aussie.zone
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      1 month ago

      On iOS you can set an app to require additional credentials to open, to prevent this situation. I’d imagine Android had something similar. I did it for all my important apps, just in case. Don’t want someone able to access my bank account or nudes.

      • schnokobaer@feddit.org
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        1 month ago

        Doesn’t help a whole lot if you hand the unlocked phone with the unlocked app to a police officer.

        • frongt@lemmy.zip
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          1 month ago

          Because if you do, you just got Cellebrite’d. Your entire phone is compromised, now and going forward.

      • BarrelAgedBoredom@lemmy.zip
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        1 month ago

        Just poked around. As far as I can tell there aren’t any options to require additional credentials to open an app on android. Im on a pixel 10 running android 17. However there is a locked “app drawer” that hides the apps from your home screen/ main app drawer that you need to have an additional password to access.

          • BarrelAgedBoredom@lemmy.zip
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            1 month ago

            Yes, but that’s a signal option, not an android option. The original commenters said ios had a feature to require additional credentials and was wondering about android, not a specific app that happens to be on android

    • Brewchin@lemmy.world
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      1 month ago

      I’ll never understand why people accept SMS 2FA as any kind of security. Might as well put it as an ad in a newspaper. 🤦🏻‍♂️

      • tumbling4986@lemmy.ca
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        1 month ago

        Because many services only have SMS as 2FA option. Especially government services.

        Also it is impossible to use google without enabling the SMS 2FA option. No matter what, with only 2FA authenticator app or email, they will lock down the account by saying “unable to verify”.

        • cmnybo@discuss.tchncs.de
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          1 month ago

          I never set a phone number on two of my google accounts and they still work fine. Those accounts are old. Google didn’t ask for a phone number to sign up back then.

          I recall seeing something about them planning to get rid of SMS 2FA last year. It looks like it’s still an option though.

          • Zarobi@aussie.zone
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            1 month ago

            Watch out, if those accounts are ever “locked”, you will get permanently locked out of the accounts. Happened to me because a data breach revealed my email address and some idiot tried brute forcing my password. Didn’t work but it broke the account. Secondary recovery email address and correct password wasn’t good enough. Support basically told me to give up and make a new account (???).

  • There have been too many of these types of events related to signal. And it has so many red flags. You are required to have a phone number which is essentially ur real identity. They used to federate with 3rd party servers but they killed that and all but wiped it from the internet. They try to shut down 3rd party clients. They don’t provide reproducible builds so we can’t trust the source. They received their initial funding from In-Q-Tel the CIA venture capital firm.

    Every time someone tries to raise any of these issues they are immediately shut down and told that its all for a good reason and that we should trust it.

    At minimum they have a full social graph of real identities with time-stamped message events. Sealed sender doesn’t negate this as signal knows ur ip address when u give them a message. They also know the destination of that message as that isn’t sealed. This is sufficient information to link sender and recipient and timestamp. That’s assuming the unreproducible builds don’t have backdoors.

    It’s all got a slightly fishy smell to it.

    Tldr: If u want actual secure messaging u should consider SimpleX

    • DomeGuy@lemmy.world
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      1 month ago

      There are all of these stories about signal because it is notable when someone gets around it

      That there’s anything approaching secure communication on a cell-phone dominated Internet whose.operating systems are either “snobbish walled garden” or “ad agency living in the corpse of a search engine” is astonishing. In the same way that a gun safety that keeps a toddler from shooting themselves with an otherwise loaded gun is astonishing.

      • GreenKnight23@lemmy.world
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        1 month ago

        can’t get around simplex encryption unless you have physical access to the device or have been physically invited by a member.

        • Natanael@infosec.pub
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          1 month ago

          Ok so no better than Signal?

          You can do all the same things and use Tor, allow Sealed sender, and rotate username with phone number hidden.

          Why does Simplex want investors?

          • GreenKnight23@lemmy.world
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            1 month ago

            what company doesn’t want to grow or maintain services? they host the primary servers that everyone uses, that costs money.

            you could host your own though. can you do that with signal?

              • GreenKnight23@lemmy.world
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                1 month ago

                as I pointed out in your other comment. signal uses a database, fails to explain why a database is required, and doesn’t even make a mention of it in their technical information.

                why use a database at all? that just introduces more attack surface area and complexity for attackers to leverage.

                • Natanael@infosec.pub
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                  1 month ago

                  Yeah precisely you didn’t check what it’s for. It doesn’t hold conversation data or even metadata.

        • DomeGuy@lemmy.world
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          1 month ago

          You should trust signal tree the same way you trust a front door lock that has never been broken or picked despite repeated attempts to do both.

          .Just remember that police only go through the door when it’s easier than breaking a window or tearing through a wall.